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their consequences, of sustainable development, the ALARA ("as low as reason-
ably achievable") principle, and the principles of protection of future generations
and of good neighbourliness are all mentioned in the text
All these elements make this Convention an important step in the field of inter-
national nuclear law.
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ARE JUDGES BEYOND CRITICISM UNDER ARTICLE 10 OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS?
A. Introduction
On the premise that democratic government is founded, inter alia, on the account-
ability of public bodies and their officials, as well as on the popular participation in
collective decision-making by the governed at all levels of government, there is
merit in the proposition that it is improper to curb open debate, especially in mat-
ters which are of public interest In so far as the work of the judiciary in general,
and of judges in particular, is in the public domain and thus of public interest, the
value of the freedom of expression applies, in principle, with equal force. Freedom
of expression in the legal domain and in relation to the work of judges serves a
variety of useful purposes in democratic society. Freedom of expression serves to
uphold the integrity of the principles of democracy which require that govern-
mental institutions should be transparent and accountable, and in that sense the
judicial domain, very much like other branches of government, benefits from a
healthy exchange and interaction of opinions. The administration of justice is bet-
ter served by well-informed participants than by ignorance, and freedom of
expression can contribute to a full and rigorous assessment of information in the
judicial context Similarly, in modern democratic society, all individuals, but
especially legal journalists, lawyers and other officials of the legal establishment,
contribute to the architecture of judicial policy through the expression of their
opinions. Freedom of expression in this context can also prove to be an instrument
of individual and professional self-fulfilment. This is considered crucial in any
society which is dependent upon the participation of the people.1
The European Court of Human Rights (the Court)2 has endorsed the import-
* Both authors have attended the meetings of the Group of Legal and Technical Experts
in charge of drafting the Joint Convention. Amelia de Kageneck represented the OECD
Nuclear Energy Agency as an observer and Cyril Pinel was a member of the French del-
egation. Amelia de Kageneck works with the Legal Affairs Section of the OECD Nuclear
Energy Agency. Cyril Pinel works in the International Relations Directorate of the French
Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique. The opinions expressed by the authors are not necess-
arily those of their respective organisations.
1. For the place of these values in a democratic society see Barend van Niekerk, The
Cloistered Virtue. Freedom ofExpression and the Administration of Justice in the Western
World (1987), chap.l. On the general principles relating to the value of freedom of
expression see Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (1987) and Frederick Schauer, Free Speech:
A Philosophical Enquiry (1982).
2. The supervision of contracting States' compliance with the Convention is presently
undertaken by the European Commission of Human Rights (Arts.19-37 of the Convention),
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ance of this principle of open debate and the unrestrained exchange of views on
matters of public interest3 in its decisions relating to Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention),4 which guarantees freedom of
expression. The Court has been particularly unyielding in upholding this freedom.
The Court has rejected various attempts to justify restrictions on critical comment
about public officials3 other than judges. Concerning judges, there is evidence to
suggest that the Court is unwilling to apply the same rigorous standard of super-
vision. The Court's approach to the criticism of judges is not entirely dissimilar to
the description adopted by one English lawyer of the popular attitude to the criti-
cism of English judges.4
Laymen treat judges as a priestly caste to whom they are reluctant to apply the stan-
dards of criticism imposed on other public servants. Lawyers tend to be conservative
in their attitudes in this as in other respects. The iron of the doctrine of precedent has
entered into their souls. If they do have suggestions for reform of the judiciary, or
comments to make on judicial performance, they whisper them to each other over
lunch in the Middle Temple or in professional journals remote from the public gaze.
Such heresies are expressed cautiously, in deferential language.
This article, which assesses the standard of supervision relating to the criticism
of judges, argues that the relative differences in the Court's case law relating to
judges are not inconsistent with the policy of upholding democratic ideals which
underlies the interpretation of Article 10, although if the changing attitudes to the
criticism of judges currently taking hold in the case law of some countries were to
become widespread, the Court could well have to reconsider its present position.
B. Criticising Judges
Although the drafters of the Convention anticipated the permissibility of limi-
tations on freedom of expression in order to uphold the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary, the scope of these principles in the practical context of criticising
the European Court of Human Rights (Arts38-56) and the Committee of Ministers
(Arts31,32 and 54), although in practice the Court's responsibilities are the most important
(see Art.45). In any case, with the recent adoption of Protocol No.ll to the Convention (text
reprinted in (1994) IS Human Rights LJ. 86) the Court and the Commission are expected to
be merged into a single court with the coming into force of the Protocol On Protocol No.l 1
see A. Drzemczweski and J. Meyer-Ladewig, "Principal Characteristics of the New ECHR
Control Mechanism as Established by Protocol 11, Signed on 11 May 1994" (1994) 15
Human Rights LJ. 81; H. G. Schemers, "The Eleventh Protocol to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights" (1994) 19 E.l_Rev. 367; A. R. Mowbray, "A New European Court of
Human Rights" (1994) Public Law 540.
3. Handysidev. United Kingdom, Eur.CtH.R.,Ser.A^4 (1976), 1 E.H.R.R. TV; Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom (No.l), Eur.CtJLR. Ser.AJO (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 245; Lingens
v. Austria, Eur.CtJtR^ Ser.A.103 (1986), 8 E.H.R.R. 103; Oberschlick v. Austria,
Eur.CtRR., Ser.A204 (1991); 19 E.H.R.R. 389.
4. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome
1950), text reprinted in Brownh'e, Basic Documents on Human Rights (1992), p326.
5. See Lingens v. Austria, supra nJ, Schwabe v. Austria, Eur.QJi.R., S«r.A742-B
(1993) (politicians); Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, Eur.CtH.R., Ser. A239 (1992), (1994)
18 E.H.R.R. 843 (police); CasteUs v. Spain, EUT.CLH.R., Ser .A236 (1992), 14 E.H.R.R. 445
(government policy).
6. David Pannkk, Judges (1987), p.105.
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judges could not have been anticipated. It is clear from the Barford v. Denmark1
and Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria1 cases that where judges are the target of
critical comment the Court applies its principles for interpreting Article 10 rather
differently. Because of the wider margin of appreciation granted to the contract-
ing States, the scope and effect of the permissible limitations are also wider in
those instances involving the criticism of judges than in the majority of instances
where other public officials are the subject of critical comment The Court's tra-
ditional bias in favour of the first paragraph of Article 10 is evidently reversed in
favour of the second paragraph in cases involving the criticism of judges, prompt-
ing the question at this point whether such a reversal of approach is in itself an
irreconcilable contradiction in the Court's policy. That there are differences in the
application of principles does not necessarily amount to such a contradiction as
long as the Court aims to uphold the ideals of democratic society relating to free-
dom of expression. It is true that these ideals may require different approaches
when the facts, contexts and circumstances are different This conclusion follows
the principles of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties.' The requirement in that provision to take account of
the context as well as the object and purpose of treaty terms allows tribunals to
arrive at different conclusions in cases which may possess common elements—in
this case the scope of freedom of expression in relation to a particular kind of
public official.
The Court has expressly highlighted differences in the application of its prin-
ciples of interpretation between the criticism of politicians on the one hand and
the criticism of governments on the other, pointing out that the limits of permiss-
ible criticism are higher with regard to the latter.10 Similar distinctions have been
drawn between the criticism of public officials and private individuals in the Lin-
gens v. Austria and Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland cases." There are conceivably
other differences of general characterisation such as between political expression,
commercial speech and civil expression under Article 10 which may necessitate
alterations in the application of the general principles. In Barford v. Denmark the
Court insisted on a higher standard of proof because in the opinion of the Court
the criticisms were of the lay judges personally,13 presupposing that a different,
perhaps lesser standard of proof would have been enough if the criticism related to
them in their official capacity. While a distinction between the personal and the
public sides of judicial responsibility may be difficult to draw in practice, the point
is here well made that the ideals of democratic society necessitate a different
approach to the criticism of judges, and in this sense the Court has been remark-
ably consistent Furthermore, the judges in Barford were not professional judges.
7. Eur.CtH.lt, Ser.A.149 (1989), (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 493.
8. Eur.CtH.R., Ser.A313 (1994), (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 1.
9. Art31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides, inter alia. "A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." For text see
(1969) 81.L.M. 679 and I. Brownlie, Basic Documents in International Law (1995), p388.
10. CasteUs v. Spain, supra n.5, at para.46.
11. Supra nn3,5.
12. Barford v. Denmark, supra n.7, at para33, for a contra conclusion see the dissenting
opinion of Judge Gokuklu, idem, pp.501-502.
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They were ordinary members of the public who were required by law to undertake
duties that one would normally expect to be performed by professionals. They
were, in reality, not acting in a professional capacity as public servants and in that
sense the limits of criticism would be expected to be narrower. In his strong dis-
senting opinion to the Pragerand Oberschlick judgment, Judge Martens endorsed
the principle of treating different forms and targets of criticisms differently as long
as the scrutiny remained consistently rigorous. Viewing the Court's decisions
relating to the criticism of judges as belonging to a separate category of cases to
which the general principles apply differently, it is beyond doubt that the Court's
conclusions were correct13 No doubt it would have been preferred for the Court to
be much more open and precise about its reasons rather than leaving it to com-
mentators to speculate on them.
Other authors have sought to explain the Court's decisions with regard to the
criticism of judges rather differently. Colin Warbrick, for instance, in his review of
Barford identifies some of these explanations, including the following:14
Fust, there is that judicial freemasonry which seems to make judges particularly sensi-
tive to the slights aimed at their brethren. Next and closely associated with it, is the
notion that judges cannot protect themselves, that the requirements of their office
forbid their engaging in controversy, particularly in matters in which they have been
involved. More fundamentally, it is an implied affirmation of the subsidiary role of the
Convention to protecting rights. There is no consistency in this but the reluctance of
the Court to substitute its judgment for the considered opinion of a national decision-
maker (particularly a national court) is marked. A minimum standard is preserved.
There may be evidence to support some of these explanations but others may turn
out to be harsh or unfounded13 The conspiracy theory explanation in the nature of
judicial freemasonry is one of the explanations for which there is no verifiable
evidence. Judges, being human, may very well be occasionally inclined to cover up
misbehaviour within their ranks, but they are professionals also. Their training,
selection and experience should be sufficiently rigorous to enable them to over-
come such shortcomings. It is also important to note that in the context of the
European Court of Human Rights, the judges are drawn from the best in the mem-
ber States and, above all else, because their tenure and salaries are paid by the
Council of Europe, they are isolated from the politics of member States. It will be
13. For a contrary view see Anthony Lester, "Freedom of Expression", in R. St J. Mac-
donald, Matscher and Petzold, The European System for the Protection of Human Rights
(1993), pp.465,477. The general conclusions of other writers on similar issues would seem to
support Lord Lester's conclusions. See e.g. Clive Walker, "Scandalising in the Eighties"
(1985) 101 L.Q.R. 359,382, where he argues that the offence of scandalising a court or judge
(an offence that could arise from criticising a court or judge under English law) might be
contrary to ArtlO(l) of the European Convention on Human Rights and also Pannick, op.
dL supra nA, at p.115, who argues that "the offence of scandalising the judiciary does survive
as an unjustifiable impediment to the freedom of speech about the judiciary".
14. Colin Warbrick, "The European Convention on Human Rights" (1989) 9 Y.EX. 439,
445.
15. E.g. on the subject of judges' inability to reply to criticism see Lord Denning in ft v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex p. Blackburn (No.2) [1968] 2 QU. 150,155; see
also Report of the Committee on Contempt of Court (Phillimore Committee Report) Cnmd
5794 (1974), para.162. For a contrary view, however, see Pannick, op. cU. supra n.6, at
pp.128-133,177-179; and Walker, op. cU. supra n.13, esp. at pp.379-380.
A P R I L 1998] Criticism of Judges and Article 10 ECHR 429
difficult successfully to canvass support within their ranks for any decision which is
based on dishonesty and corruption within the judiciary of a contracting State.
The other explanations may have substance mainly because of the special
characteristics of the judicial branch of government That branch and the judges
who are part of it must be treated differently from the other branches, especially
the executive branch. Judges have to be independent and yet conceptually they are
a part of the government with responsibilities to control all forms of official
excesses. In any society governed by law, where this makes the maintenance of
public confidence in the judiciary indispensable, harsh criticism which questions
the integrity of judges also questions their independence and if it is unfounded can
be damaging to the democratic process. In these circumstances one must admit
that it is not ideal that judicial self-discipline is the only practical means of calling
this branch of government to account, making the judicial branch the inevitable
weak link in the effort to attain the ideals of democratic society. This fact though
should not cause undue concern unless there is evidence of abuse and exploitation
of this weakness in practice. This risk has been a part of democratic political theory
of the founding States of the Council of Europe. All member States today ascribe
to the original ideals, with their shortcomings, including the extra protection for
the judicial branch. In the United Kingdom, for example, the law of contempt of
court," both in the face of and out of the court, under which nothing is allowed to
be done which undermines public confidence in the court, scandalises the court or
threatens the independence of the judiciary, is an example of the special protec-
tion laid down for the judicial branch.17 Similar protection exists in the laws of
other countries and this has always been a factor to be balanced against the indi-
vidual's freedoms guaranteed in the domestic context." In most of the countries of
the Council of Europe there are a variety of formal as well as informal mechanisms
for restricting or penalising criticism of judges. Countries such as France, Nether-
lands, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Norway and of course Denmark (the country from
which Barford originated) have widely drafted provisions in their penal codes
which may be interpreted to make it an offence to criticise judges." There are
other countries, such as Germany, Switzerland and Austria (whence Prager and
Oberschlick originated), where the laws on civil and criminal defamation are open
to judges and private citizens in exactly the same way.20 Treating judges as private
citizens under the ordinary laws of defamation makes the necessity of a higher
16. See Sunday Times (No.l), supra n3, at para.60.
17. Inftv. Gray [1900] 2Q.B. 36,40, Lord Russell of Killowen defined contempt of court
"Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court into
contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of court" See generally on this subject
Phillimore Report, supra n.15, esp. at chaps-1 and 7, and C. Borrie and N. Lowe, The Law of
Contempt (1973), esp. chap.6. See also the UK Contempt of Court Art 1981. For a discussion
of the effect of the 1981 Act on the subject of scandalising the judiciary see Walker, op. cU.
supra n.13.
18. For a review of cases in this field in other, mostly common law Commonwealth juris-
dictions see Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, Media Law (1992), pp.296-299. In
other, mostly Continental European countries the protection of judges is usually incorpor-
ated in their Civil and Criminal Codes. See also Walker, ibid.
19. For a review of the provisions of the relevant Penal Codes in these countries see van
Niekerk, op. a t supra n.l, at chap.2.
20. Ibid.
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standard of proof inevitable. Such an approach may have had an influence on the
reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights. In some other countries, such
as Germany, some of the restraints on judicial criticisms are imposed by principles
of professional ethics,21 while in other countries, including the Netherlands and
Switzerland, some of the inhibitions are driven by cultural attitudes.22 In Swit-
zerland, for instance, it has been argued that the decentralisation of judicial re-
sponsibilities between the federal government and the cantons has created "a
close interaction between local communities (which, for the most part, are
extremely conservative according to Western European standards) and the legal
profession, a situation that results in a much greater degree of cozy conformism
and a lack of critical scrutiny of the administration of justice".23
In effect, it is possible to conclude that, on the matter of criticising judges, there
is a consistent and firmly established practice (albeit of different approaches) not
to tolerate it, especially if such criticism is immoderate. On this basis, and also in
the light of the principle of subsidiarity in relation to the version of democracy
which guides the interpretation of the Convention, it certainly would have been
unusual for the Court of Human Rights to seek radically to amend this relation-
ship without compelling reasons. The suggestion that the Court is reluctant to sub-
stitute its judgment for the considered opinion of a national court is correct in this
context, especially on an issue such as the protection of the judiciary, upon which
there is a fair amount of consensus in the various legal systems under the Conven-
tion. The practice of protecting judges from abuse is so well grounded in the theory
and practice of Western liberal democracy that it can be altered only by the con-
tracting States themselves.
In mirroring the practice in member States the Court's conclusions on the criti-
cism of judges amount, in effect, to the imposition of prior restraints on freedom of
expression in this field. In principle, prior restraints can undermine the purposes of
freedom of expression in a democratic society and should be used restrictivery.24 In
relation to the press, for instance, prior restraints can create a "chilling" effect in
the performance of their duties as public watchdog. The European Court of
Human Rights generally recognises the damaging effect of prior restraints25 but




24. The US Supreme Court has held prior restraints on freedom of speech to be unconsti-
tutional and thus illegal: see New York Times Co. v. United States 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
25. In Goodwin v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123, involving the disclosure of
journalistic sources, the Court said (at para.29): "Protection of journalistic sources is one of
the basic conditions for press freedom, as is reflected in the la ws and the professional codes of
conduct in a number of Contracting States and is affirmed in several international instru-
ments on journalistic freedoms. Without such protection, sources may be deterred from
n«i«ting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest As a result the vital
public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide
accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected. Having regard to the import-
ance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and
the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that free-
dom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is
justified by an overriding requirement of public interest."
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asm of judges. In other words, the Court recognises, in cases involving the criti-
cism of judges, a real danger of undermining the democratic principles within
which member States operate. As indicated, it is an imperfect form of democracy
which on occasions such as those discussed here can accommodate deviations
from the ideal norms.
1. Impartiality of tribunal
There is another important dimension of the freedom of expression debate in
the present context This relates to the question of how much weight, and if so in
which direction, should be attached to the fact that, when individuals are charged
with offences relating to the criticism of judges, the matter is adjudicated upon by
the alleged victim's colleagues. In the special protection for the judicial branch of
government through the law of contempt or other similar offences, courts are
called upon to perform an impossible task of upholding the democratic process by
ironically being judges in their own cause. The simple and perhaps unequivocal
fact that by the nature of their professional training judges should be able to isolate
most if not all of their prejudices does not necessarily address the perceptions from
the external outlook that the case is somehow tainted with some degree of impar-
tiality. Should the domestic and international courts, in recognition of this fact, be
prepared to lend greater weight to the freedom of expression principle in this con-
text? Although this issue was not argued before the domestic courts or the Euro-
pean Court, it deserves to be highlighted because of its potential impact on the
quality of the judgments in this type of case. There is a specific requirement in
Article 6(1) of the Convention for an impartial tribunal in the determination of
civil rights or criminal charges. This has been interpreted to involve two tests—a
subjective test and an objective test According to the Court of Human Rights:2*
The existence of impartiality for the purpose of Article 6(1) must be determined
according to a subjective test, that is on the bias of the personal conviction of a par-
ticular judge in a given case, and also according to an objective test, that is ascer-
taining whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate
doubt in this respect
It is the latter—objective—impartiality, which is usually based on appearances17
rather than on empirical fact, which is at issue in the present context This notion of
objective impartiality is the equivalent of the requirement in most common law
jurisdictions that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done.
Both Barford and Prager and Oberschlick can be said to have impacted on this
matter of objective impartiality, which under normal circumstances could lead to
the setting aside of domestic court decisions by the European Court. The factor of
inevitability—that is to say, judges alone under the system of government have this
responsibility for adjudicating disputes of this nature—makes it impossible to
remove the cases involving criticism of their colleagues from their jurisdiction.
The issue of potential bias in the objective sense will have to remain unresolved.
26. Hauschildt v. Denmark Eur.CtH.R-, Ser.A.154 (1989), para.46; (1990) 12 E.H.R.R.
266.para.46.
27. Sramek v. Austria, Eur.CtH.R., Ser.A.84 (1984), para.42; (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 351,
para.42.
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It is possible, however, to assess this same matter from a completely different
angle: that of competing rights claims involving the freedom of expression on the
one hand and maintaining confidence in the judicial process on the other.3 Judges
are expected to strike a balance which upholds the democratic process. It is clear
from this balancing process that the criticism of judges and their work as such is not
prohibited and, as one English judge succinctly put it:29
The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are permitted to err therein:
provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to
those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right
of criticism, and are not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of
justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to
suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary
men.
Legitimate criticism must, however, be distinguished from "personal, scurrilous
abuse of a judge".30 In an attitude not entirely dissimilar to that adopted by the
European Court of Human Rights in Prager and Oberschlick, the practice in most
domestic courts is to accept temperate, reasoned and fair criticism.31 Thus, accord-
ing to Lord Salmon in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex pane Blackburn
(No.2), "it follows that no criticism, however rigorous, can amount to contempt of
court, provided it keeps within the limits of reasonable courtesy and good faith".32
In Prager and Oberschlick, for instance, the domestic Austrian courts and the
European Court were persuaded by the immoderate nature of the language used.
It was also felt that such language was unnecessary and rather disproportionate in
view of the fact that there was no overwhelming evidence from the article that
obvious injustices had been done as a consequence of the judges' behaviour. In
these circumstance the criticisms seemed more gratuitous value judgments and
less of a fair comment Such a conclusion allows any court to attach less weight to
the freedom of expression claim.
C. Progressive Trends
In English law, as in other jurisdictions such as Canada, there is a growing feeling
that the special and extra protection for the judiciary does not need strict enforce-
28. A similar sentiment was expressed by Mr Justice Black in the majority opinion in
Bridget v. California 314 U.S. 252,260 (1941) where he indicated that "free speech and fair
trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilisation, and it would be trying to
choose between them".
29. Per Lord Atkin in Ambard v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC.
322,335.
30. Per Lord Russell of Killowen CJ in R. v. Gray [1900] 2 Q3.36,40—in dealing with a
newspaper article which described a judge as an "impudent little man in horse hair, a micro-
cosm of conceit and empty headedness".
31. See i t v. Western Printing and Publishing Limited (1954) III G C C 122 (Newfound-
land Sup.Ct), referred to in Borne and Lowe, op. cit supra n.17, at pp.163-164; R. v. Wise-
man [1969] N.Z.L.R. 55; R. v. Gray, ibid, where Lord Russell pointed out that "judges and
courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered
against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no court could or would treat
that as contempt of court". See also R. v. Fletcher, ex p . Kisch (1935) 52 CL.R. 248 and
Attorney-General v. Butler [1953] N.Z.L.R. 944.
3Z [1968] 2 Q.B. 150,155.
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ment in order to uphold the democratic ideals. The English judge Lord Diplock,
for instance, recently indicated that contempt of court arising from scandalising
the judiciary has become "virtually obsolescent in the United Kingdom",33 and
before then another English judge had expressed the view that citation and pros-
ecution for contempt arising from critical comments about the judiciary and their
work were not at all worthwhile." It is equally noteworthy of this changing trend
that in the heat of the infamous Spycatcher35 litigation (1987) in the United King-
dom the Daily Mirror newspaper was not prosecuted for contempt when it pub-
lished upside-down photographs of the members of the House of Lords who had
granted an injunction prohibiting publications about the book, under the headline
"YOU FOOLS".3* In fact, the number of prosecutions for this sort of contempt in
the United Kingdom has reduced considerably37 and there has not been a success-
ful prosecution for over half a century.3*
It was the conventional wisdom in the United Kingdom until recently that
judges had to be insulated from the controversies and thus criticisms of the day.
This was publicly expressed in terms of the fact that judges were vulnerable in so
far as they were not able to reply to criticisms. In reality the truth lay in what have
come to be known as the "Kilmuir Rules", by the terms of which no judge was
allowed to speak publicly without the prior approval of the Lord Chancellor's
office. When Lord Kilmuir wrote the so-called Kilmuir Rules in a letter to the
Director-General of the BBC in 1955, he was far more transparent about the rea-
son for keeping judges' protection. He reasoned that "So long as a judge keeps
silent his reputation for wisdom and impartiality remains unassailable; but every
utterance which he makes in public, except in the actual performance of his
judicial duties, must necessarily bring him within the focus of criticism."" The pre-
sent Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfem, came to the conclusion that the
facade sought to be built around judges was incompatible with the independence
of the judiciary and so he abolished the Kilmuir Rules.40 Today, the atmosphere in
which judges operate is far more liberal41 and judges take and, when appropriate,
33. Secretary of State for Defence v. Guardian Newspapers Limited [1985] A.C. 339,347.
34. Per Lord Hailsham in Badry v. DPP of Mauritius [1982] 3 All E.R. 973. In that case
Commonwealth countries were urged not to punish for contempt for scandalising the
judiciary except for the most extreme forms of abuse.
35. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No2) [1990] A . C 109, [1988] 3 All
E.R. 545 (HL).
36. Referred to in Robertson and Nicol, op. dt supra n.18, at p.298.
37. WalkeT, op. at supra n.13, at pp.377-378. See also Pannick, op. at. supra n.6, at
pp.115-116, where he points out "The continued existence of the offence [of scandalising
the judiciary under English law], and the memory of successful prosecutions, inhibits
journalists, who wrongly suspect that they have a legal obligation to speak respectfully and
cautiously when discussing the judiciary. In fact, there is little danger of prosecution now-
adays for criticising the j udiciary, irrespective of the ferocity of the language used, unless one
suggests that the court lacks impartiality."
3a Walker, idem, pJ59.
39. A. W. Bradley, "Judges and the Media—The Kilmuir Rules" (1986) P.L. 383,385.
40. Lord Mackay of Clasbiern, The Administration of Justice (1994), pp.25-26.
41. In reply to a parliamentary question on the issue of public statements by judges, the
Parliamentary Secretary at the Lord Chancellor's Department (Mr Streeter) reiterated the
requirement under the principle of independence of the judiciary "for each judge to decide
individually whether to make public statements". He confirmed that a copy of the Lord
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reply to criticism fairly well. The process of liberalising the environment in which
UK judges operate has just begun and, while it has to be admitted that it will take
some time to reach a stage where criticisms are taken for granted, it is inevitable
that the liberalising process is an irreversible one.
The exposure of the judiciary to harsh criticism, often including value judg-
ments and individual opinion, without fear of prosecution has always been the
standard practice in the United States. For example, in the case of Bridges v. Cali-
fornia? the US Supreme Court failed to find a constitutional basis for the fines
imposed on the petitioners for being in contempt of court when they published
their views*3 on judicial decisions. Justice Black, who wrote on behalf of the major-
ity, opined that the State could curtail freedom of expression only where "the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about... substantive evils".44 The
judge dismissed the prosecution's argument based on the potential for disrespect-
ing the judiciary, and in the process reiterated what may be identified as the Amer-
ican approach, by pointing out45
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from
published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For
it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect
good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely
in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resent-
ment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect
The Court also rejected the attempt to isolate judicial criticism as a special case to
Chancellor's advice on the matter had been sent to every judge and new judges would con-
tinue to receive the same advice on appointment In a follow-up question, Mr Gordon Pren-
tice asked if Streeter did not feel the independence of the judiciary would be compromised in
circumstances such as when the Chairman of the Conservative Party, Dr Brian Mawhinney,
asked members of the public to write to judges and seek to intimidate them for handing down
lenient sentences. Streeter replied: "That was a fairly extraordinary outburst On appoint-
ment in 1987, my right hon. and noble friend the Lord Chancellor relaxed the rules to enable
judges to speak out on issues of the day. It is important that experienced and senior judges
speak out, express their opinions and take a full part in debates in the House of Lords... It is
important that members of the public make their views known, if they feel that sentences
passed in local communities are not appropriate, by going to see or writing to their Members
of Parliament That is what we call democracy": HC Hansard, Vol.289, coLl (3 Feb. 1997).
The author is grateful to Janet Tweedale of the Lord Chancellor's Department for drawing
his attention to this statement
42. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
43. The most serious of the publications appeared in an editorial of the Los Angela
Times, under the headline "Probation for Gorillas?" in which two members of a labour union
who had previously been convicted of assaulting a non-union driver closed with the obser-
vation: "Judge A. A. Scott will make a serious mistake if he grants probation to Matthew
Shannon and Kennan Holmes."
44. Bridges, supra n.42, at p.261, relying on the previous cases of Gidow v. New York 268
U.S. 652 (1925) and Schenck v. United States 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
45. Bridges, idem, p.270. He noted further that to regard such publications as causing
substantial influence upon the course of justice would be to impute to judges a lack of firm-
ness, wisdom or honour idem, p.273. Other authors have argued, fairly convincingly too, that
the security of tenure enjoyed by judges in democratic society already protects them from
any potentially harmful effects of public criticism: see Pannkk, op. at. supra n.6, at p.133 and
Walker, op. dt supra n.13, at p381.
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which the constitutional immunity from punishment was inapplicable.46 Instead
the Court found that "the unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers [of the
constitution] were intended to give to liberty of the press, as to other liberties, the
broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society".47 A similar
approach was adopted by the Court in the later case of Pennekamp v. State of
Florida, in which Justice Murphy expressed a strong opinion in support of press
freedom and against the offence of contempt of court48
freedom [of the press] covers something more than the right to approve and condone
insofar as the judiciary and the judicial process are concerned. It also includes the
right to criticise and disparage, even though the terms be vitriolic, scurrilous or
erroneous. To talk of a clear and present danger arising out of such criticism is idle
unless the criticism makes it impossible in a very real sense for a court to carry on the
administration of justice.
It is useful to highlight the US case of Garrison v. State of Louisiana," mainly
because the facts of that case bear some similarities to the Prager and Oberschlick
case before the European Court of Human Rights. Garrison concerned the con-
viction of a District Attorney for making uncomplimentary remarks about eight
judges of the criminal district of the New Orleans parish. He had told a press con-
ference that he attributed the large backlog of pending criminal cases to the inef-
ficiency, laziness and excessive vacations of the j udges. He further accused them of
hampering his efforts to enforce the vice laws by refusing to authorise sufficient
funding to cover the expenses of undercover investigations. "This", according to
him, "raises interesting questions about the racketeer influence on our eight
vacation-minded judges." The Supreme Court concluded that the rule which pro-
hibits the punishment of individuals for the criticism of public officials protects the
public interest in the flow of information to the people concerning public officials,
and to this end anything that might touch on the officials' fitness for office is rel-
evant According to Justice Brennan, "a candidate [for public office] must surren-
der to public scrutiny and discussion so much of his private character as affects his
fitness for office".30 Unlike the European Court of Human Rights in Prager and
Oberschlick, the Supreme Court refused to endorse the conviction for contempt of
court
A similar trend of not punishing criticism of the judiciary seems to have
emerged in Canadian jurisprudence, especially since the enactment of that
country's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In R. v. Kopyto" a lawyer was charged
with contempt of court by scandalising the court as a result of comments which he
made to a newspaper reporter following the dismissal of a case in which he acted as
counsel for the plaintiff. His comments included the following assertions:9
46. Bridges, idem, p.263.
47. Idem, p.265.
48. 66 S.Ct 1029,1048-1049 (1946).
49. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
50. Idem, p.77. It is important to point out that freedom of expression within the context of
the US Constitution is not perceived as an absolute right On this point see Dennis v. United
States 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
51. 47 D.L.R. (4th) 213 (1987).
52. Idem,p219.
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This decision is a mockery of justice. It stinks to high hell. It says it is okay to break the
law and you are immune so long as someone above you said to do it Mr Dowson and I
have lost faith in the judicial system to render justice. We're wondering what is the
point of appealing and continuing this charade of the courts in this country which are
wrapped in favour of protecting the police. The courts and the RCMP are sticking so
close together you'd think they were put together with Krazy Glue.
The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed his appeal against the conviction for con-
tempt, inter alia, on the ground that the offence of contempt by scandalising the
court did not constitute a recognised and permissible limitation upon the guaran-
teed right of freedom of expression provided by section 2(b) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.33 The Court reasoned that the inherent assump-
tion in the offence, which required no proof, that the words spoken by the appli-
cant will bring the court into contempt or lower its authority is arbitrary, unfair and
based upon irrational considerations; and in the absence of proof that the words
did in fact bring the court into disrepute the conviction should fail the pro-
portionality test required of all permissible limitations under the Charter.54 On the
wider question of whether judges should receive special protection from criticism
in the performance of their duties, Cory JA opined;0
As a result of their importance the courts are bound to be the subject of comment and
criticism. Not all will be sweetly reasoned An unsuccessful litigant may well make
comments after a decision is rendered that are not felicitously worded. Some criticism
may be well founded, some suggestions for change worth adopting. But the courts are
not fragile flowers that will withCT in the heat of controversy... They [the courts and
judges] need not fear criticism nor need they seek to sustain unnecessary barriers to
complaints about their operations or decisions.
In a strong personal statement supporting the decision, Houlden JA expressed his
confidence in the strength of the Canadian judiciary and courts "to withstand criti-
cism after a case has been decided no matter how outrageous or scurrilous that
criticism may be". He continued:56
I feel equally confident that the Canadian citizenry are not so gullible that they will
lose faith and confidence in our judicial system because of such criticism. If the way in
which judges and courts conduct their business commands respect, they will receive
respect, regardless of any abusive criticism that may be directed towards them ...
I appreciate that by the very nature of their office, judges and courts cannot
respond to criticism of what they have done. I do not believe, however, that this a
53. Idem, pp.240-241.
54. Idem, pp.238-240, citing as authority the Supreme Court decision in ft. v. Oakes 26
D.L.R. (4th) 200 (1986) especially the judgment of Dickson CJC at p.227.
55. Kopyto, idem, p.227. In an earlier paragraph (idem, p.226) the same judge had applied
to judges and courts views which are not too <tiwjmilar from those of the European Court of
Human Rights when he asserted: "A democracy cannot exist without the freedom to express
new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions. These
opinions may be critical of existing practices in public institutions and of the institutions
themselves. However, change for the better is dependent on constructive criticism. Nor can it
be expected that criticism will always be muted by restraint Frustration with outmoded
practices will often lead to vigorous and unpropitious complaints. Hyperbole and colourful,
perhaps even disrespectful lnn£imgg, may be the necessary touchstone to fire the interest and
imagination of the public, to the need for reform, and to suggest the manner in which that
reform may be achieved."
56. Idem, pp.255-256.
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sufficient justification for putting courts and judges in a different position from other
public bodies, such as parliament, provincial legislatures, municipal governments and
the police. Accordingly, I would hold that the offence of wanrinlim'ng the court is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter.
The changing attitudes to the criticism of judges and the judiciary has just begun
to take shape and a majority of countries—including most of the member States
of the Council of Europe—still handle the subject with considerable sensitivity.
The changing trend is not by any means an overwhelming one, and in fact the
attention of the Court of Human Rights does not seem to have been drawn to
this changing practice and the strong reasoning contained in the relevant cases.
If and when these cases are considered by the Court one can expect a different
approach.
It is undeniable that the changing trend in Canada and the United Kingdom and
the standard practice in the United States commend themselves strongly and the
more so because they form the standard which provides a more credible human
rights protection regime in a modern democratic society. The emerging attitude is
more likely than the traditional conservative approach to enhance the fullness of
freedom of expression. As one author has strongly argued:37
Criticism of the judiciary is not the dangerous evil feared by those who would protect
the courts. The benefits of freedom of expression are as strong in this context as in
others. Criticism of judges will not damage the rule of law. It may, by identifying
defects in the legal system, promote the cause of justice.
In a democratic society it is prudent to avoid the risk of drowning any group of
people, including judges, in veneration and self-satisfaction, only two of the
uncommendable vices associated with the absence of criticism.*
D. Conclusion
In an environment where all forms of exchange of ideas and opinions are con-
sidered beneficial, it should come as no surprise that curbs on criticism by public
authorities are considered unacceptable. Because opinion expressed through
criticism is usually driven by the desire to question or call public officials to
account, it serves the purposes of the democratic society well. The European
Court of Human Rights in seeking to uphold the ideals of democratic society has
endorsed this idea by interpreting the permissible limitations in paragraph 2 of
Article 10 restrictively. The effect of the Court's approach generally, and
especially in relation to the criticism of public officials, is to be tolerant of even the
most caustic of criticisms. The degree or level of toleration, however, depends on
the facts of each case and the Court has sought to consolidate its policy in this
regard by distinguishing the effect on the democratic process of criticism of differ-
ent groups such as governments, politicians and ordinary individuals. Judges,
according to the case law of the Court, are not beyond criticism in any society
governed by law, although the level of toleration of criticism of them may be lower
57. Pannkk, op. dt supra n.6, at p. 128.
58. A similar view has been expressed by idem, p.137.
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than of that of other public officials. In cases involving the criticism of judges, the
contracting States are accorded wider margins of appreciation and value judg-
ments will also need to be supported by proof. In an ideal democratic society one
would expect that the call on all public officials to account will be without excessive
limitation, as has always been the case in the practice relating to the criticism of
government policy and politicians. The unique role performed by judges in such a
society is, however, perceived as necessitating a different approach to criticism of
them because a less than rigorous supervision of that criticism can undermine
rather than enhance the democratic process.39 This conclusion mirrors the consist-
ent practice in most if not all member States of the Council of Europe. Following
the principle that the Court will not impose its own standards of human rights,
especially in contexts where there is a sufficiently consistent Europe-wide practice
on the specific issue, the Court's conclusions on the criticism of judges are not in
conflict with its established case law under Article 10 of the Convention.
It is evident from the discussion thus far about criticising judges that the subject
has always been treated with considerable sensitivity. Years, and in some cases
centuries, of practice may be necessary to provide the confidence with which to
treat the subject differently. The European Court of Human Rights supervises a
relatively immature legal regime of no more than half a century and, as a body
which is viewed with some understandable degree of remoteness and suspicion,
the cautious approach in this matter is advisable. In time, one can expect its confi-
dence to grow and it can then be expected to adopt policies which are more inter-
ventionist The Court cannot, however, afford to ignore the changing trends
around the world. Until these trends in themselves become overwhelming in their
effect on the thinking of the Court, its present approach to the criticism of judges
will remain conservative and imperfect in the eyes of its critics. While it is possible,
at the present time at least, to argue that the Court's decisions relating to the criti-
cism of judges are justifiable and satisfactory, this may not be the case in the future.
Even with the imperfections of democratic practice in Europe, it is important for
the Court to be guided by Blackstone's counsel that40
A representative democracy ceases to exist the moment that the public functionaries
are by any means absolved from their responsibility to their constituents; and this
happens whenever the constituent can be restrained in any manner from speaking,
writing or publishing his opinions upon any public measure, or upon the conduct of
those who may advise or execute it
The Court's supervisory role surely extends to ensuring that human rights stan-
dards in member States are not riiminishp.fi in the light of changing circumstances.
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